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A TEXTBOOK DILEMMA:  SHOULD THE 
FIRST SALE DOCTRINE PROVIDE A VALID 
DEFENSE FOR FOREIGN-MADE GOODS? 
Melissa Goldberg*
 
 
The “first sale” doctrine, section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
gives the owner of a lawfully made copy of a work the right to sell it without 
the copyright holder’s authorization.  Section 602(a), meanwhile, 
In John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, the Second Circuit held that the 
statutory language of the first sale doctrine, specifically the words 
“lawfully made under this title,” does not extend the first sale safe harbor 
to copies made outside of the United States.  This holding rendered it 
unnecessary to consider whether the anti-importation provision applies.  In 
so doing, the Second Circuit relied on its reading of the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Costco v. Omega. 
prohibits 
the unauthorized importation of a copyrighted work.  What happens if 
someone buys a copy of a work outside of the United States, brings the copy 
into the United States, and then tries to sell it?  Does the “first sale” 
doctrine apply, so that the foreign copy can be sold in the United States?  
Or does the anti-importation provision control?  If it does, the seller would 
not be able to invoke the “first sale” safe harbor and would be liable under 
federal copyright law if she did not obtain the copyright holder’s 
authorization for the U.S. sale. 
This Note suggests that the Supreme Court should find that the Second 
Circuit was incorrect in its interpretation of the first sale doctrine, but this 
Note does not decide whether the anti-importation provision should apply 
to Kirtsaeng if the case is remanded. The Wiley court misinterpreted the 
first sale doctrine’s statutory language and also misconstrued the holding 
in Omega, in which the Court split 4–4 on the relevant issue, creating no 
binding precedent.  The Wiley holding creates a perverse incentive:  
copyright holders can now avoid the first sale doctrine altogether by 
moving  production overseas.  This holding conflicts with the fundamental 
balance of policies at the core of copyright. 
  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., 2009, University of 
Michigan.  I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Thomas Lee, for his guidance.  I 
would also like to thank my friends and family, especially my parents, Michelle and Jeff 
Goldberg, for their constant support and encouragement.  For my uncle, Keith Jay Goldberg. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The first sale doctrine, section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
allows a purchaser of a copyrighted good to resell the item without the 
copyright holder’s permission, as long as there has been an initial sale by 
the copyright owner.1
 
 1. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
  However, section 602(a) of the Copyright Act 
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creates an exclusive right for copyright holders to import their goods into 
the United States.2
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng,
  This Note discusses the tension between these two 
sections, namely whether the first sale doctrine is a valid defense for the 
sale of copyrighted goods that have been imported. 
3 the Second Circuit held that the 
first sale doctrine was not a defense for the unauthorized importation of 
goods manufactured outside of the United States.4  The specific issue in 
Wiley was whether the language of section 109(a) of the Copyright Act 
extends only to goods “lawfully made in the United States,” or whether it 
also applies to goods made anywhere in the world.5  Adopting the former 
standard, the Second Circuit created a bright-line rule that disallows the 
unauthorized sale of products produced abroad and potentially expands the 
rights given to copyright owners.6
This Note analyzes the potential effects of the Wiley decision.  Part I 
provides a background of the issues underlying the Second Circuit’s 
decision.  It discusses the evolution of copyright law and the first sale 
doctrine, the nature of the gray market and its relation to copyright law, and 
how other courts have interpreted the same issue.  Part II explores the Wiley 
decision.  Part III suggests that the Second Circuit came to the wrong 
conclusion and analyzes the effects of the decision.  Instead, this Note 
argues that the Supreme Court should rule that the first sale doctrine can 
apply in situations where a copyrighted good has been manufactured 
abroad, so long as there has been a valid first sale.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
Part I of this Note introduces statutes and case law relevant to the Wiley 
holding.  Part I.A outlines the constitutional origins and policies inherent in 
the Copyright Act.  Part I.B then provides a chronological overview of the 
case law behind the first sale doctrine.  Finally, Part I.C discusses the 
statutory implications of extraterritoriality and how this principle has been 
applied to the Copyright Act. 
A.  An Overview of Copyright Protection 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”7
 
 2. See id. § 602(a)(1). 
  Copyright laws are therefore “wholly 
 3. 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) 
(No. 11-697). 
 4. See id. at 224. 
 5. Id. at 218–19.  Section 109(a) provides that the owner of a copyrighted work 
“lawfully made under this title” has the right to resell the work. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 6. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 224. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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statutory, and depend[] upon the rights created under the acts of 
Congress.”8
The First Congress enacted the original copyright law in 1790 under its 
Article I powers.
 
9  The copyright law developed a “limited monopoly” for 
authors and inventors to balance two core concerns:  the benefit for the 
public and the rights of creators.10  The primary interest of copyright law, 
as derived from the language of the Constitution, is to “advance public 
welfare”11 by securing “the general benefits derived by the public from the 
labors of authors.”12  A secondary interest of copyright law is to incentivize 
authors and creators to produce those works by receiving “personal gain” in 
the form of copyright protection.13  Courts and commentators have 
consistently acknowledged that financial reward to creators is not the 
dominant goal of copyright legislation and must be balanced against the 
public benefit.14
1.  Rights Given to Copyright Holders 
 
After numerous amendments and revisions to the 1790 law, Congress 
passed the Copyright Act of 1976.15  Section 10616 of the Copyright Act of 
1976 gives copyright holders five exclusive rights,17 including the exclusive 
right to distribute their copyrighted work.18
 
 8. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908). 
  Congress clarified that 
“[u]nder this provision the copyright owner would have the right to control 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5660. 
 10. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 11. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 12. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (characterizing these benefits as 
the “sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly”). 
 13. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.  Although the interest in supplying authors with a benefit is 
secondary to the benefit to the public, providing compensation is the most effective way to 
encourage the artist to allow the public access to the work. See United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“It is said that reward to the author or artist serves 
to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.”); H.R. REP. NO. 60-
2222, at 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 57 (E. 
Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by 
Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the 
author has in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be 
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for 
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”). 
 14. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 
(2011); see also Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 (discussing how creating copyright laws 
“involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and 
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand”); supra note 
12 and accompanying text. 
 15. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.). 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 17. Id.  The five rights include the right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, 
distribute copies, perform the work publicly, and display the work publicly. Id. § 106(1)–(6). 
 18. Id. § 106(3) (granting the copyright holder the right “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease, or lending”). 
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the first public distribution of an authorized copy or phonorecord of her 
work, whether by sale, gift, loan, or some rental or lease arrangement.”19  
The Congressional Report further specified that “any unauthorized public 
distribution of copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be 
an infringement.”20
Sections 107 through 122
 
21 limit these “exclusive” rights.22  The first 
sale doctrine is embodied in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act.23  To 
emphasize the limitations on the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to 
distribute, Congress stated that a copyright owner’s rights under section 
106(3) end if “he has parted with ownership of” a particular good.24
2.  Copyright Infringement 
 
An infringement of the Copyright Act consists of a violation of sections 
106 through 122 or a violation of the importation clause of section 602.25  
Section 106 details the exclusive rights of copyright holders, and sections 
107 through 122 contain the exceptions to those rights.26  Section 602 
provides two classes of goods that are illegal to import without the 
copyright holder’s permission.27
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of 
copyright under this title,  of copies or phonorecords of a work that have 
been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the 
exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, 
actionable under section 501.
  Section 602(a)(1) makes any importation 
without the copyright holder’s permission an infringement regardless of 
whether the good was lawfully made: 
28
 There are three exceptions to section 602(a).  There is no liability if:  (1) 
the importation is for use by the government, (2) the person importing the 
goods will use them for her own private use, or (3) the goods will be used 
for educational or religious purposes.
 
29  Notwithstanding these exceptions, 
section 602(a)(2) provides that any importation of infringing items is 
actionable.30  These include “pirated” goods made without the copyright 
holder’s permission.31
While it was illegal to import pirated goods prior to passage of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, there was nothing copyright holders could do to 
 
 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675–
76. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122. 
 22. See id. §§ 106–122. 
 23. See id. § 109(a). 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
 26. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text. 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 602. 
 28. Id. § 602(a)(1). 
 29. See id. § 602(a)(3)(A)–(C). 
 30. See id. § 602(a)(2). 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. 
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prevent importation of legally made works.32  In response to copyright 
holders’ concerns, the Copyright Office produced draft legislation between 
1961 and 1965.33  During the first drafting of the importation provision in 
1961, the Register of Copyrights opposed liability for unauthorized 
importation of lawfully made goods.34
By 1964, however, the Copyright Office had drafted a provision that 
“made the unauthorized importation of copies for distribution an 
infringement.”
 
35  Although concerns arose regarding the scope of the 
importation provision in relation to the first sale doctrine, the Copyright 
Office did not provide any concrete guidance.36  Eventually, section 
602(a)(1) was adopted to prohibit importation of lawfully made goods.37  
At the time, section 601 restricted the importation or distribution of works 
that were manufactured outside of the United States.38
[T]he importation into or public distribution in the United States of copies 
of a work consisting preponderantly of nondramatic literary material that 
is in the English language and is protected under this title is prohibited 
unless the portions consisting of such material have been manufactured in 
the United States or Canada.
  The section 
provided as follows: 
39
Despite Congress’s statements that the importation clause “has nothing to 
do with the manufacturing requirements of section 601,”
 
40 courts have 
interpreted section 602(a)’s applicability by referring to the location of 
manufacture.41
 
 32. See L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1115–
16 (1996) (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION, PART 2:  DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 212 (Comm. Print 1963)). 
 
 33. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
PART 5:  1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS, at iii (Comm. Print 1965) 
[hereinafter 1964 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION] (discussing H.R. 11947, which was 
“introduced . . . on July 20, 1964, as a basis for further discussion” and H.R. 4347, which 
was pending at the time of the report).  The Register of Copyrights is the “director of the 
Copyright Office of the Library of Congress” and is responsible for “[a]ll administrative 
functions and duties” under Title 17. 17 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
 34. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
PART 1:  REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. 
COPYRIGHT LAW 126 (Comm. Print 1961) (stating that it saw no reason to “impose the 
territorial restriction in a private contract upon third persons with no knowledge of the 
agreement”). 
 35. Christopher A. Mohr, Comment, Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law:  An End 
Run Around K Mart v. Cartier, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 561, 602 (1996). 
 36. See id. at 602–03. 
 37. See id.; see also Sebastian Int’l Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 
1093, 1097 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining the evolution of the importation clause). 
 38. See 17 U.S.C. § 601. 
 39. Id. § 601(a) (emphasis added). 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 169 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5785.  
This language is also used in a number of reports and revisions that discuss section 602. See 
Mohr, supra note 35, at 591 n.147. 
 41. See infra Part I.B. 
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Section 601 was intended to support the American printing industry.42  
When the provision was repealed in 2010,43 Congress amended section 
602(b) by deleting the phrase, “unless the provisions of section 601 are 
applicable.”44
The House Report to the 1976 Act provided a list of the main arguments 
that Congress considered in determining if section 601 should be 
eliminated.
 
45  One argument to eliminate the requirement was that “[t]he 
manufacturing clause violate[d] the basic principle that an author’s rights 
should not be dependent on the circumstances of manufacture.”46  The 
House Report also stressed that repealing the provision would not drive 
manufacturing to foreign countries.47  The Committee ultimately decided to 
repeal the requirement, but in a phased-out process.48
3.  First Sale Doctrine 
 
As discussed above, the exclusive rights of copyright holders are subject 
to a number of exceptions.49  The first sale doctrine is a limitation on a 
copyright holder’s distribution rights after she has made an initial sale of 
her work.50  Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act states:  “Notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by 
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell 
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”51
This concept is also described, notably in patent law,
 
52 as exhaustion:  
once a copyright owner has transferred a copy of her good, her rights in 
distribution are exhausted.53
 
 42. See Stonehill Commc’ns, Inc. v. Martuge, 512 F. Supp. 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(“That purpose is purely economic in support of the American printing industry; it is to 
require certain kinds of books to be manufactured in the United States or Canada in order to 
qualify for American copyright protection.”). 
  Thus, if an individual legally purchases a 
 43. See id.; Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-295, § 4(a), 124 Stat. 3180, 3180. 
 44. Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010 § 4(c), 124 Stat. at 
3181. 
 45. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 164–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5780–82. 
 46. Id. at 165. 
 47. See id.  Advocates for repeal argued that fears of driving the U.S. manufacture of 
books to foreign countries were “unfounded.” Id.  Opponents of the repeal contended that the 
manufacturing clause “ha[d] been responsible for a strong and enduring” book production 
industry in the United States. Id. 
 48. See id. at 166. 
 49. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text. 
 50. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). 
 51. Id. § 109(a). 
 52. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 53. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 92 n.301 (Aug. 2001), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf.  The 
principle of exhaustion stems from section 202, which describes that ownership of the 
“material object,” such as a book containing copyrighted work, is separate and distinct from 
ownership of the copyrighted work itself, and only provides a limitation on the distribution 
right. 17 U.S.C. § 202. 
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book, she can freely resell it, or give it away without the risk of liability 
because the copyright owner no longer has control over the future sale of 
the book.  This doctrine only applies when there is a transfer of the title to a 
good through a sale or gift, and does not apply to mere possession.54
Four requirements must be met to have a valid first sale defense:  (1) the 
copyright holder gives authorization for the good to be lawfully made; (2) 
the good is transferred with the copyright holder’s authority; (3) the 
defendant is a lawful owner of the good; and (4) the defendant disposes of 
the good.
 
55
The U.S. Supreme Court first endorsed the first sale doctrine in 1908, 
when it decided Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.
 
56  The Court addressed the 
meaning of the copyright owner’s “sole right to vend” under the 
contemporary copyright statute.57  The Court explained that the statute’s 
main purpose was “to secure the right of multiplying copies of the work.”  
It reasoned that once a copyright owner sells her goods “in quantities and at 
a price satisfactory to it[,] [he] has exercised the right to vend.”58  The 
Court held that any further rights granted to the copyright holder would 
expand the statute’s meaning beyond the plain language of the statute.59  
Therefore, without a contractual limitation or agreement, the copyright 
holder could not restrict the future sale of goods.60
Congress codified this doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 
Act).
 
61  Originally derived from the common law principles against 
“restraints on alienation of property,”62 17 U.S.C. § 27 stated:  “nothing in 
this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any 
copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully 
obtained.”63  The coinciding House Report further specified that this 
statute’s intent was to codify the pre-existing law regarding the right to 
vend.64
 
 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 109; 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
 
14, § 8.12[B][1][a]; see also 
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146–47 (1998) 
(“[B]ecause the protection afforded by § 109(a) is available only to the ‘owner’ of a lawfully 
made copy (or someone authorized by the owner), the first sale doctrine would not provide a 
defense to a § 602(a) action against any nonowner such as a bailee, a licensee, a consignee, 
or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful.”). 
 55. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.12[B][1][a] (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. 
v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). 
 56. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 57. Id. at 350. 
 58. Id. at 351. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). 
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899 
(“The first sale doctrine has its roots in the English common law rule against restraints on 
alienation of property.”). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909). 
 64. See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 19 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 13, at 519 (discussing that the codified first sale 
doctrine did “not intend[] to change in any way existing law” and attempted “to make it clear 
that there is no intention to enlarge in any way the construction to be given to the word 
‘vend’”).  
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The next substantial congressional revision to the first sale doctrine is 
embodied in the 1976 Copyright Act.  The Copyright Office held 
discussions and conducted studies to develop recommendations for 
Congress.65  The phrase “lawfully made under this title” was first placed in 
the revision bill to section 109(a) in 1964.66  During the drafting process, 
Barbara Ringer, who later served as Register of Copyrights, explained that 
“under this title” should be added to the statute to indicate that the doctrine 
was for copies “made under the authority of the copyright owner” and as 
those “lawfully made by virtue of a compulsory license.”67
The Copyright Act’s modification in 1976 reaffirmed the first sale 
doctrine in section 109(a).
 
68  Congress explicitly stated that it meant to 
“restate[] and confirm[] the principle” of the first sale doctrine that had 
“been established by the court decisions and section 27 of the [1909 
Act].”69  Although this suggests that section 109(a) is the same as section 
27 of the 1909 Act, it differs because section 109(a) only applies to 
copyrighted works “lawfully made under this title.”70  However, as Ringer 
noted, the House Report on the revised language stated that “lawfully made 
under this title” includes copies “legally made under the compulsory 
licensing provisions of section 115.”71
The policy of the first sale doctrine is consistent with the policy 
underlying copyright law:  to balance the public benefit against the rights of 
creators.  The first sale doctrine typically ensures that a copyright holder 
will receive a “reward” for her work:  when a copyright owner sells the 
item, she receives a value through the purchase price.
 
72
 
 65. See 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:20 (2011). 
  An adequate 
“reward,” however, will not disallow the first sale defense, as the doctrine is 
applicable whenever there is a transfer of ownership of a good, which may 
 66. See id.; see also Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 
1378, 1386–87 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (discussing the legislative history of section 109(a)). 
 67. 1964 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 33, at 66–67 (mentioning a solution for 
Congress to avoid certain complexities of the wording).  The language was changed to 
clarify instances where a compulsory license would give someone other than the copyright 
owner the right to profit from recordings of musical compositions. See id.; Stephen W. 
Feingold, Parallel Importing Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
113, 131 (1984). 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 69. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. 
 70. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79. 
 72. See, e.g., Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 
1099 (3d Cir. 1988) (“With respect to future distribution of those copies in this country, 
clearly the copyright owner already has received its reward through the purchase price.”); 
Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[T]he 
ultimate question . . . [is] ‘whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that 
it may fairly be said that the [copyright owner] has received his reward for the use of the 
article.’” (quoting United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942))); Parfums 
Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1993) 
(“[T]he distribution right and the first sale doctrine rest on the principle that the copyright 
owner is entitled to realize no more and no less than the full value of each copy or 
phonorecord upon its disposition.”). 
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happen by gift or for below market price.73  For example, the “reward” test 
originated in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc.,74 and was used 
where the copyright owner had not authorized the first sale because the sale 
occurred in bankruptcy.75  Ultimately, courts will not “reexamin[e] the 
adequacy of the ‘reward’ received by the copyright owner in an alleged first 
sale where the owner has consented to that sale.”76
The rights conferred to the copyright owner are viewed in the context of 
the public’s interest in free alienation of goods:  by protecting innocent 
third parties who purchase goods and allowing them to have control over 
the work.
 
77  This balancing act has been described as the “single-reward 
principle,” such that a copyright owner is entitled to a one-time reward for 
the sale of a particular good, after which the right shifts to the public 
benefit.78
4.  Gray Market and Parallel Imports 
 
The first sale doctrine is commonly discussed in the context of gray 
market goods.  Gray market goods are genuine goods bearing a U.S. 
copyright or trademark that are manufactured and meant to be sold in 
foreign countries, but are sold in the United States without the copyright 
holder’s authorization.79  The act of unauthorized importation of these 
goods is also referred to as “parallel importation.”80  Because goods 
produced for the foreign market are generally priced lower than goods for 
the domestic market, gray market goods are sold in the United States at a 
lower price than the same goods that have been manufactured in the United 
States.81
 
 73. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Basmajian, 600 F. Supp. 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(first sale doctrine applied for goods given as a gift). 
  Not surprisingly, copyright holders and gray market retailers have 
opposing views of parallel importation. 
 74. 315 F.2d 847. 
 75. See id. at 855. 
 76. Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 77. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.12[B]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, 
at 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 
13, at 72  (“In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions:  First, 
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, second, 
how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?  The granting of such 
exclusive rights . . . confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the 
temporary monopoly.”). 
 78. See John A. Rothchild, Exhausting Extraterritoriality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1187, 1191–92 (2011). 
 79. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988).  Gray market goods are 
not counterfeited goods or goods made abroad to be sold in the United States. See Theodore 
H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Applying Grecian Formula to International Trade:  K Mart Corp. v. 
Cartier, Inc. and the Legality of Gray Market Imports, 75 VA. L. REV. 1397, 1398 (1989). 
 80. See William Richelieu, Note, Gray Days Ahead?:  The Impact of Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research International, Inc., 27 PEPP. L. REV. 827, 828 (2000). 
 81. See Seth E. Lipner, The Legality of Parallel Imports:  Trademark, Antitrust, or 
Equity?, 19 TEX. INT’L L.J. 553, 554 (1984); Danielle G. Mazur, Note, The Gray Market 
After K Mart:  Shopping for Solutions, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 641, 641–42 (1990). 
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Copyright owners and others oppose gray markets for several reasons.  
First, the gray market creates unwanted intrabrand competition between 
authorized domestic dealers, instead of creating competition against other 
brands.82  Second, because foreign-made goods may differ in quality and 
lack warranties, the gray market may hurt goodwill and cause consumer 
confusion.83  Similarly, when a product is for sale at a discount store, it can 
hurt the product’s image.84  For these reasons, the copyright owner may not 
receive the full benefit of her work and, therefore, the gray market may 
impair the incentive for authors and artists to create works.85
By comparison, proponents of the gray market believe that the gray 
market is beneficial for consumers because it provides lower prices,
 
86 and 
in turn creates more competition between brands, which gives consumers 
more options and limits price discrimination.87  It has also been argued that 
geographic price discrimination has a negative distributional effect on 
social welfare because copyright owners benefit while consumers suffer.88  
Congress has also recognized that parallel markets are advantageous for 
consumers, and has passed a number of statutes to regulate the gray 
market.89
Parallel importation is commonly seen in the textbook market because 
students are mandated to purchase certain books for classes.
 
90  Economic 
research on differential pricing indicates that domestic prices of hardcover 
textbooks are approximately 50 percent higher than the international 
counterpart.91  Similar studies have indicated that public college students 
spend approximately $1,168 on textbooks and school supplies per year.92
 
 82. See Mazur, supra note 
  
81, at 642; see also John C. Cozine, Casenote, Fade to Black?  
The Fate of the Gray Market After L’Anza Research International, Inc. v. Quality King 
Distributors, Inc., 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 775, 778–79 (1998). 
 83. See Mazur, supra note 81, at 642, 669–70 (discussing how gray markets mislead 
consumers because they are expecting a product of a certain quality, yet gray market goods 
may be of a lower quality); see also Cozine, supra note 82, at 778–79 (discussing how these 
products may not be warranted, contain instructions in another language and do not meet 
U.S. safety regulations). 
 84. See Cozine, supra note 82, at 779. 
 85. See Jay P. Moisant, Addressing the Grey Market—What the Supreme Court Should 
Have Done, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 653 (1999). 
 86. See Cozine, supra note 82, at 779. 
 87. See Richelieu, supra note 80, at 833. 
 88. See generally Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001). 
 89. See, e.g., Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, 
§ 2320(b)(3)(B), 120 Stat. 285, 287 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 68-109, at 19 (2005) (statement of 
Rep. John Conyers, Jr.) (“Not only has this practice been upheld by the Supreme Court, but 
it also saves consumers billions of dollars each year. . . .  [W]e now have a bill that protects 
manufacturers, targets illegitimate actors, and leaves a legitimate industry unscathed.”). 
 90. See generally JAMES V. KOCH, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOK PRICING AND 
TEXTBOOK MARKETS (2006); available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/
list/acsfa/kochreport.pdf; Christos Cabolis et al., A Textbook Example of International Price 
Discrimination, 95 ECON. LETTERS 91 (2007) (arguing that books for the U.S. market are 
priced significantly higher due to the forced demand created by higher education). 
 91. See Cabolis et al., supra note 90, at 2. 
 92. Quick Guide:  College Costs, BIG FUTURE, C. BOARD, https://bigfuture.collegeboard.
org/pay-for-college/college-costs/quick-guide-college-costs (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  In 
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Further, textbook publishers constantly update the editions, which compels 
students to purchase new books instead of used copies.93  To avoid these 
high expenses, students may purchase books through the gray market.94
5.  Combating the Gray Market 
 
Finding the gray market to be harmful to business, brand owners employ 
strategies to curtail it.95  One approach, which is utilized by the copyright 
owners discussed in this Note, is to place copyrightable material within a 
non-copyrightable good, or even on the label or packaging.96  Copyright 
owners then attempt to use section 602(a) to curb the importation of gray 
market goods.  However, the first sale doctrine may be used as an 
affirmative defense to these actions.97
Sections 109(a) and 602(a) appear to directly conflict.  While section 
602(a) gives the copyright holder a cause of action against anyone who 
imports their work without their permission, section 109(a) provides a 
defense if there has been a first sale of the good. 
  The problem that then arises is that 
the Copyright Act does not provide guidance as to how these sections 
should work together. 
B.  Interpretations of the First Sale Doctrine 
The issue addressed in Wiley, whether the first sale doctrine should be 
applied extraterritorially and as a defense to the importation bar, has been 
addressed in a number of other circuits.  Because the legislative history 
does not directly address the interaction of sections 602(a) and 109(a),98 
courts have attempted to determine how the provisions should relate to each 
other.  In interpreting the doctrine, there are two factors that are discussed 
in most of the case law:  location of the first sale of the good and the place 
of manufacture.99
 
2010, college students spent an estimated $4.5 billion on textbooks. Editorial, IPads Won’t 
Make Textbooks More Affordable, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-01-30/why-ipads-won-t-make-students-textbooks-more-affordable-view.html. 
 
 93. See Jeff Shelstad, The Demise of the $200 Textbook, GOOD (July 8, 2010, 2:30 
PM), http://www.good.is/post/the-demise-of-the-200-textbook. 
 94. See generally Christine Ongchin, Note, Price Discrimination in the Textbook 
Market:  An Analysis of the Post-Quality King Proposals to Prevent and Disincentivize 
Reimportation and Arbitrage, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 223 (2007). 
 95. See id. at 241–57.  Textbook publishers use two general means to prevent parallel 
importation:  (1) “actions that prevent reimportation, allowing publishers to continue 
practicing price discrimination at the current level”; and (2) “actions that decrease the 
incentives to reimport by making reimportation and arbitrage less profitable.” Id. at 242. 
 96. See infra notes 113, 134, 147, 172. 
 97. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 98. See Doris R. Perl, Comment, The Use of Copyright Law to Block the Importation of 
Gray-Market Goods:  The Black and White of It All, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 665 (1990) 
(“Legislative history does not provide sufficient guidance to clarify the relationship between 
sections 109(a) and 602(a).”). 
 99. See Rothchild, supra note 78, at 1215–16.  Courts that rely on place of manufacture 
as the dispositive factor rely on the text of the first sale doctrine, whereas courts that rely on 
location of the sale rely on the “absurd results” if the first sale doctrine would not apply. See 
id. 
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1.  The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit addressed the issue of the first sale doctrine’s scope in 
Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.100  
Notwithstanding the circuit court opinion, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision in Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc.101
a.  Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania:  Manufactured Abroad 
 is relevant to this Note’s 
analysis because is often relied on in other cases. 
In 1983, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Scorpio102 that the 
first sale doctrine was not a limitation on section 602(a)’s importation 
right.103  The case involved phonorecords whose copyright was held by 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).104  CBS authorized Vicor, a 
Philippines corporation, to manufacture and sell the recordings only in the 
Philippines.105  Vicor sold the records to another Philippines corporation, 
who then sold the goods to a Nevada corporation, which imported the 
copyrighted records and sold them to Scorpio Music Distributors 
(Scorpio).106
In finding that the first sale doctrine was not a valid defense to an 
allegation of copyright infringement, the district court noted that the 
Copyright Act does not have extraterritorial reach, especially without 
explicit congressional intent.
 
107  The court acknowledged the concern that 
Scorpio’s interpretation would make section 602 “virtually meaningless” by 
allowing U.S. importers to buy from a third party, thereby sidestepping the 
copyright owner’s exclusive right to import goods.108  Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that the first sale doctrine was only applicable as a defense 
where the goods have been “legally manufactured and sold within the 
United States.”109
b.  Circuit Court:  Manufactured Domestically 
 
In Sebastian,110 the Third Circuit held that the first sale doctrine was a 
limitation on copyright holders’ importation rights under section 602(a).111
 
 100. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). 
  
The copyrighted goods at issue were labels on bottles of hair care products 
 101. 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See  id. at 49. 
 104. See id. at 47. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 49 (“The protection afforded by the United States Code does not extend 
beyond the borders of this country unless the Code expressly states.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 111. See id. at 1099. 
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that the plaintiff (Sebastian) produced and manufactured in the United 
States.112  Sebastian shipped the goods into a South African distributor, 
who imported the goods back to the United States.113  Sebastian then filed 
an action for copyright infringement.114
The district court found for Sebastian, holding that it had a right to 
control importation regardless of the location of manufacture or the location 
of the first sale.
 
115  The district court articulated two types of distribution 
rights:  vending, which is limited by the first sale doctrine, and importation, 
which is.116
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed that the applicability of section 
602(a) does not depend on the location of the first sale.
 
117  The Third 
Circuit, however, disagreed with the district court and held that in making a 
first sale, the copyright holder had exhausted its distribution rights.118  By 
relying on the principle that the first sale doctrine provides copyright 
holders with a single reward, the court stated, “Nothing in the wording of 
section 109(a), its history or philosophy, suggests that the owner of copies 
who sells them abroad does not receive a ‘reward for his work.’”119
Under the court’s analysis, any first sale, whether made domestically or 
abroad, ends the copyright holder’s exclusive distribution rights.
 
120  In so 
doing, the Third Circuit held that section 109(a) specifically limits section 
602(a).121  According to the court, the statutory language of section 602(a) 
states that illegal importation infringes on the exclusive right to distribute 
under section 106(3).122
 
 112. See id. at 1094. 
  The court found that because the first sale doctrine 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. at 1095. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1099. 
 118. Id. (“We differ, however, with the district court's finding of infringement because, in 
our view, a first sale by the copyright owner extinguishes any right later to control 
importation of those copies.”).  The court articulated the single-reward principle as follows:  
the “ultimate question under the ‘first sale’ doctrine is whether or not there has been such a 
disposition of the copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the copyright proprietor 
has received his reward for its use.” Id. at 1096–97 (quoting Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. 
Arrow Drug, Inc. 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964)). 
 119. Id. at 1099.  The court further stated: 
Nor does the language of section 602(a) intimate that a copyright owner who elects 
to sell copies abroad should receive “a more adequate award” than those who sell 
domestically. That result would occur if the holder were to receive not only the 
purchase price, but a right to limit importation as well. 
Id. 
 120. The court did not specifically rule on the meaning of “lawfully made under this title” 
because the good was produced domestically. Id. at 1098.  However, the court did “confess 
some uneasiness” with Scorpio’s holding that the phrase meant that the good had to be 
manufactured domestically. Id. at 1098 n.1.  Instead, referring to section 601(a)’s 
manufacturing requirement, the court reasoned that Congress explicitly stated when they 
intended the location of manufacture to be important, and therefore, Congress would have 
limited section 109(a) to a specific location if it intended the location to be determinative.  
Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 109(a), 602(a) (2006). 
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limits section 106(3), and section 602(a) is a violation of section 106(3), 
then the first sale doctrine must limit section 602(a) importation rights.123  
This means that the importation rights of copyright holders under section 
602(a) are not an additional right conferred to the holders, but constitute a 
component of the right to distribute.124
The court distinguished Scorpio, noting that the goods in Scorpio were 
produced overseas, while the goods in Sebastian were produced in the 
United States.
 
125  Also, where the copyrighted good in Scorpio was a 
phonorecord, the copyrighted item in Sebastian was a label on the 
product.126  Although this was not determinative, the court noted that 
“[t]his case comes to us in the guise of an alleged copyright infringement 
but, in reality, is an attempt by a domestic manufacturer to prevent the 
importation of its own products by the ‘gray market.’”127
2.  The Ninth Circuit 
 
The 1991 case BMG Music v. Perez128 created a split between the Ninth 
and Third Circuits.129  In that case, the copyrighted sound recordings were 
manufactured abroad, and imported into the United States without BMG’s 
permission.130  The district court found for BMG.  On appeal the Ninth 
Circuit, relied heavily on Scorpio to find that section 109(a) could only be a 
defense for goods produced and sold in the United States.131  The court 
placed great emphasis on the reasoning that section 602 would be 
“render[ed] meaningless” if the first sale doctrine had a different 
meaning.132
Then, in Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,
  
133 the Ninth 
Circuit held that there was no first sale defense where the copyrighted good, 
a perfume box, was manufactured abroad and subsequently imported.134
 
 123. See Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099 (“[I]t necessarily follows that once transfer of 
ownership has cancelled the distribution right to a copy, the right does not survive so as to be 
infringed by importation.”). 
  In 
dicta, however, the court acknowledged the broad scope of its holding in 
BMG and consequently indicated that the first sale doctrine could be a 
defense for foreign-manufactured goods if the first sale is made in the 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 1098 (discussing how Scorpio, although not binding precedent, 
“demonstrate[s] a significant difference from the factual situation presented here”). 
 126. See id. at 1094. 
 127. Id.; see supra Part I.A.5. 
 128. 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 129. See supra notes 100–01 (discussing Sebastian).  Although the court made an effort 
to distinguish Sebastian because of a different fact pattern, the analysis of the court 
“logically cannot coexist” with the Third Circuit’s analysis. Mohr, supra note 35, at 596. 
 130. See BMG, 952 F.2d at 319. 
 131. Id. (“The words ‘lawfully made under this title’ in §109(a) grant first sale protection 
only to copies legally made and sold in the United States.”). 
 132. Id. at 319–20. 
 133. 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 134. See id. at 481–82.  
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United States.135  In detailing the history of the relevant copyright 
provisions, the court explained that section 602(a) “ensures that a U.S. 
copyright owner will gain the full value of each copy sold in the United 
States.”136
Acknowledging the “widespread criticism” of BMG when it decided 
Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.,
  Thus, the circuit court found the dispositive factor to be where 
the first sale of a copyrighted good takes place, as opposed to where it is 
manufactured.  Nevertheless, because these were not the facts before the 
court, this interpretation remains dicta and is not binding authority within 
the Ninth Circuit. 
137 the Ninth Circuit relied on 
the prior holdings and dicta from Parfums Givenchy and limited the 
applicability of the first sale doctrine for goods where the first sale takes 
place in the United States.138  In Denbicare, the good in question was 
imported with the permission of the copyright holder, and the circuit court 
allowed a first sale defense.139  Because the sale was a result of a 
bankruptcy trustee auction, the plaintiff argued that there was no first sale 
because he did not receive an economic benefit.140  The court rejected this 
argument, explaining that “[j]ust as courts will not inquire into the 
sufficiency of consideration, there is no justification for reexamining the 
adequacy of the ‘reward’ received by the copyright owner in an alleged first 
sale where the owner has consented to that sale.”141
3.  The Supreme Court:  Manufactured in the United States, Sold Abroad, 
and Imported Without Authorization 
  Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the first sale was a valid defense because a sale in a foreign trade 
zone was subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and therefore the good was acquired 
in the United States. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.142 to resolve the 
conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits over the relationship between 
sections 602 and 109.143  The Court followed the analysis in Sebastian, and 
held that sellers were protected by the first sale doctrine as long as the first 
sale is made in the United States.144
 
 135. See id. at 481.  The court discussed how the holding from BMG “would lead to 
absurd and unintended results,” such as giving “foreign manufactured goods . . . greater 
copyright protection than goods manufactured in the United States.” See id. at 482 n.8. 
  Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, 
however, indicated that the place of manufacture might not be decisive 
 136. Id. at 481. 
 137. 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 138. See id. at 1149–50. 
 139. Id. at 1145–46. 
 140. Id. at 1150. 
 141. Id. at 1151.  The plaintiff was relying on Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, 
Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963).  In that case, the defendant made unauthorized copies 
of plaintiff’s goods. See id. at 851.  This is different from Denbicare because the “reward” 
test was applied to an involuntary sale. See id. at 855. 
 142. 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
 143. See id. at 140; see also supra notes 110–25 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Quality King, 523 U.S. 135, at 145–49. 
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where the copyrighted good has made a “round trip”—where the good was 
produced in the United States, exported abroad, and later shipped back into 
the country without the copyright holder’s permission.145
The plaintiff, L’anza Research, manufactured hair care products with a 
copyrighted label, and sold the goods both domestically and 
internationally.
 
146  L’anza sold products in the United States at a higher 
price than it did abroad.147  The company made the first sale of the goods in 
question to a distributor in the United Kingdom.148  A third party then 
bought those products without L’anza’s permission and shipped them back 
into the United States; they eventually made their way to Quality King 
Distributors.149  L’anza brought a copyright infringement suit against 
Quality King, and the district court refused Quality King’s assertion of the 
first sale doctrine defense.150
The Supreme Court identified the main issue of the case to be whether 
the first sale doctrine limited the importation clause in the same way that 
the doctrine limited the exclusive rights of section 106(3).
 
151  In holding 
that it did, the Court followed the reasoning of Sebastian, and adopted a 
plain language interpretation of section 602(a).152
The Court first noted that section 109 expressly limits section 106 
rights.
   
153  Next, it concluded that section 602(a) “does not categorically 
prohibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted materials,” but does 
make importation an infringement of the section 106 rights.154  The 
majority concluded that section 602 is subject to the same limitations of 
section 106—in other words, “§ 602 violations [are] a species of § 106 
violations. . . .  If § 602(a) functioned independently, none of those sections 
would limit its coverage.”155
The Court rejected claims that its holding would render section 602 
meaningless.  The Court noted that section 109 has a “necessarily broad 
reach.”
 
156  Section 602(a), however, is “broader because it encompasses 
copies that are not subject to the first sale doctrine—e.g., copies that are 
lawfully made under the law of another country.”157
 
 145. See id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
  In dicta, the Court 
 146. See id. at 138–39 (majority opinion). 
 147. See id. at 139. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 139–40. 
 150. See id. at 140; L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., No. CV-
94-00841, 1995 WL 908331, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1995) (holding that the first sale 
doctrine was not a defense for a U.S. copyrighted good that was sold abroad).  When the 
case was before the Ninth Circuit, the court stated that “[w]hile many courts, including the 
Ninth Circuit, have followed Scorpio, the consensus among legal scholars is that the 
reasoning of Scorpio is flawed.” L’Anza Research Int’l Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 
98 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 151. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138. 
 152. See id. at 143–46. 
 153. See id. at 144. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 149–50. 
 156. Id. at 152. 
 157. Id. at 148. 
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provided the following hypothetical to illustrate concerns regarding the 
applicability of the first sale doctrine to copyrighted works made “under the 
law of another country”158
If the author of the work gave the exclusive United States distribution 
rights—enforceable under the Act—to the publisher of the United States 
edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the 
British edition,
: 
 however, presumably only those made by the publisher of 
the United States edition would be “lawfully made under this title” within 
the meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not provide the 
publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in the American 
market with a defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter, to 
an action under § 106(3), if there was a distribution of the copies).159
Although this hypothetical suggests that a foreign-made good would not 
be “lawfully made under this title,” a similar example was used in the 
revision process leading to passage of the 1976 Act, which sheds a different 
light on the example.
 
160  The transcript of oral argument implied that the 
goods made by the British publisher were “made pursuant to the British 
copyright.”161
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, classifying the copyrighted good’s 
pattern of distribution and sale as a “round trip,” illuminates a significant 
gap in the current first sale doctrine.
  Yet, because the hypothetical’s reasoning is not applicable 
to the facts of the instant case, as the goods were produced domestically, 
this application remains only dicta. 
162  She stated:  “[W]e do not today 
resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured 
abroad.”163  She then cited to a number of sources that indicated a 
presumption against the Copyright Act’s extraterritorial application.164
 
 158. See id. 
  
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 148 n.20 (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG. 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 4:  FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 119 (Comm. Print 1964) (statement of Harriet F. 
Pilpel)). 
 161. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–7, Quality King, 523 U.S. 125 (No. 96-1470), 
1997 WL 765595, at *11–17, *35.  The hypothetical that Quality King’s counsel provided in 
response to Justice Stevens’s questioning is as follows: 
If an author gives the British copyright to his or her book to a British company, 
and the U.S. copyright to his or her book to a U.S. copyright holder, the U.S. 
copyright holder obviously wishes to avoid having the unrelated British copyright 
holder ship 1,000 copies of the book here because the U.S. copyright holder has no 
control over the independent entity, has not been paid anything for those copies, et 
cetera. 
Id. at *12. 
 162. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697) (discussing how the 
concurrence demonstrated the “key factual difference” that was present in the case); Omega 
S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining the 
concurrence and stating that “[t]he majority opinion did not dispute this interpretation, which 
aligns closely with the one adopted by our circuit”). 
 163. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 164. Id.  Justice Ginsburg cited to two copyright treatises.  The first parenthetical stated:  
“provisions of Title 17 do not apply extraterritorially unless expressly so stated, hence the 
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Thus, Quality King left open the question whether the first sale doctrine 
could apply to goods manufactured abroad and imported without the 
copyright owner’s permission. 
4.  The Ninth Circuit After Quality King:  Manufactured Abroad, Sold 
Abroad, and Imported Without Authorization 
In Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,165 the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the unanswered question from Quality King, and held that the first sale 
doctrine was unavailable as a defense for goods manufactured abroad.166  
Omega produced watches in Switzerland that were engraved with a 
copyrighted logo, and sold the watches to international distributors.167  
These distributors sold the goods to a New York company, who in turn sold 
the watches to Costco, which then sold the watches in California.168  
Omega filed a suit alleging copyright infringement, to which Costco 
asserted a first sale defense.169  The district court ruled in favor of Costco, 
and Omega appealed.170
The Ninth Circuit first summarized the applicable circuit law.
 
171  Under 
Ninth Circuit precedent, section 109(a) did not apply to copies 
manufactured abroad unless an authorized first sale was made 
domestically.172  The court stated that reliance on these cases would require 
reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Costco.173
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its holdings might be at odds with 
Quality King, but concluded that Quality King was not “clearly 
irreconcilable” with Ninth Circuit precedent.
 
174  First, the court found that 
Quality King did not “directly overrule” Ninth Circuit case law, because the 
goods in Quality King were manufactured domestically, and therefore the 
Supreme Court did not decide the scope of the first sale doctrine for 
foreign-made goods.175
 
words ‘lawfully made under this title’ in the ‘first sale’ provision, . . . must mean ‘lawfully 
made in the United States.” Id. (citing WILLIAM PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 166–
70 (1997 Supp.)).  The second parenthetical stated:  “Copyright protection is territorial.  The 
rights granted by the United States Copyright Act extend no farther than the nation’s 
borders.” Id. (citing to PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 16.0, at 16:1–16:2 (2d ed. 1998)). 
  Next, the court held that the Supreme Court’s 
“brief discussion on extraterritoriality” was not irreconcilable with 
precedent that limited the first sale doctrine to domestically manufactured 
 165. 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 983. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See supra notes 128–41 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Omega, 541 F.3d at 986; Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 
F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1996); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 
477, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991); Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 173. See Omega, 541 F.3d at 986. 
 174. Id. at 987. 
 175. Id. 
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goods.176  Instead, the court stated that there was an even stronger 
presumption against extraterritoriality for the Copyright Act.177
In addition, the court relied on the dicta from Quality King—specifically, 
the hypothetical provided by the majority opinion—to conclude that 
“lawfully made under this title” only refers to copies of works made 
domestically.
   
178  The court noted that this was even more persuasive 
because the Quality King majority did not dispute Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence, which stated that the first sale doctrine only applies to works 
made in the United States.179
Costco argued that limiting section 109(a) “to domestically made copies 
is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and its legislative 
history,” but the Ninth Circuit dismissed this by relying on Drug Emporium 
and Denbicare.
 
180  The court explained that the exception that section 
109(a) may be a defense if an authorized first sale was made in the United 
States resolved the concerns that the manufacture of copyrighted goods 
would be driven abroad.181
Costco was appealed to the Supreme Court.  Parties on both side of the 
parallel importation debate—including retailers and unions,
 
182 library 
associations,183 and publishing associations184
 
 176. Id. 
—filed amicus briefs.  Justice 
Kagan recused herself because she had worked on the case as the Solicitor 
 177. Id. at 988.  The court stated: 
Recognizing the importance of avoiding international  conflicts of law in the area 
of intellectual property, however, we have applied a more robust version of this 
presumption to the Copyright Act, holding that the Act presumptively does not 
apply to conduct that occurs abroad even when that conduct produces harmful 
effects within the United States. 
Id. 
 178. See id. at 989 (citing Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 
U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (No. 08-1423), 
2009 WL 1759033; Brief of eBay Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Omega, 131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 2797466.  Under the doctrines of 
contributory and vicarious liability, these groups could be exposed to copyright infringement 
suits as well. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913 (2005). 
 183. The briefs for libraries indicated that a limitation of the first sale doctrine would hurt 
library lending because of the estimated 200 million foreign made books in U.S. libraries. 
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Pub. Knowledge, Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries et al., Omega, 
131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 2749651; Brief Amici Curiae of the Am. Library 
Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners, Omega, 131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 
2749653. 
 184. See, e.g., Brief for the Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. and the Recording Indus. 
Ass’n of Am. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Omega, 131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-
1423), 2010 WL 3518659; Brief for Ass’n of Am. Publishers as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondent, Omega, 131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 3518658. 
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General.185  The case was affirmed by a vote of 4–4 in a single sentence per 
curiam opinion,186 and is only binding precedent on the Ninth Circuit.187
C.  Extraterritorial Application 
 
As Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Omega mentions, statutory 
construction presumes that a U.S. law will not govern matters in other 
countries.188  Absent evidence of contrary congressional intent, federal 
statutes are presumed “to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.”189  The “longstanding principle of American law”190 against 
extraterritorial application of federal statutes may be overcome by “‘the 
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” that the statute 
should apply to foreign matters.191  If a law does not have extraterritorial 
application, then “infringing actions that take place entirely outside the 
United States are not actionable.”192
This principle “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates 
with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”
 
193  Moreover, interfering 
with another country’s authority “would be unjust”194 and could create 
“incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries.”195
 
 185. See Omega, 131 S. Ct. at 565. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, Omega, 131 S. Ct. 565 (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 979062. 
  It is 
arguable that Congress intends U.S. laws to “(1) address[] domestic 
concerns; (2) respect[] the comity of nations by not interfering with the 
legislative prerogatives of other sovereigns; and (3) avoid[] unjustly 
 186. Omega, 131 S. Ct. at 565.  For a more detailed discussion of the case, see generally 
Lindsay R. Aldridge, Note, Costco v. Omega and the First Sale Doctrine, 12 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 325 (2011). 
 187. The Supreme Court has held that “no affirmative action can be had in a cause where 
the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be 
made.” Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868).  Therefore, where the 
Supreme Court affirms the lower court’s decision as a result of an equally divided court, the 
decision will bind that circuit only and not create precedent. See generally Edward A. 
Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 
(2002). 
 188. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  In line with Justice Ginsburg’s 
discussion, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Copyright Act has no extraterritorial 
application without clear congressional intent. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comms. 
Co., 24 F.3d. 1088, 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 189. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
 190. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 191. Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). 
 192. Subafilms, 24 F.3d. at 1091 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In the context of a 
U.S. patented product that had a foreign first sale, a district court stated that extraterritorial 
effect “refers to imposing liability under United States law for conduct occurring outside the 
United States.  Holding that exhaustion is triggered by the authorized foreign sale of a 
patented product does not impose liability of this sort, and thus does not amount to giving 
extraterritorial effect to the patent law.” LG Elecs., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 
1036, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 193. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
 194. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). 
 195. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885. 
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penalizing a person for conduct that is consistent with the law of the 
territory where the conduct occurs.”196
II.  WILEY AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
 In August 2011, the Second Circuit narrowed the availability of the first 
sale doctrine in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng.197  The court 
affirmed the district court’s decision that “[t]he first sale doctrine does not 
apply to goods produced outside of the United States.”198  To understand 
how the court reached their decision, Part II.A provides a description of the 
facts of the case, and details the procedural history.  Next, Part II.B parses 
the Second Circuit’s decision by looking at the majority’s reliance on 
Quality King and the court’s statutory analysis.  Part II.B then examines the 
policy implications of the holding, and discusses the Wiley dissent.199
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
  
The plaintiff, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., published books for both 
domestic and international markets.200  Wiley’s wholly owned subsidiary, 
Wiley Asia, manufactured foreign editions of the books.201  Although 
Wiley Asia produced the books, Wiley held the U.S. copyright protection 
and limited the markets in which foreign editions were sold.202  Wiley 
further retained the rights to sell and publish its books domestically.203
The U.S. edition textbooks generated a greater profit for Wiley than the 
foreign editions.
   
204  Books that Wiley intended to be distributed in the 
international market contained the same written material as their domestic 
counterparts, but editions were inferior in quality and features.205  For 
example, some lacked supplemental study guides and were made with 
lower quality printing material.206  The front cover of foreign edition 
textbooks stated that they were Wiley international editions, and contained 
imprints on the back cover that specified that they were only to be sold in 
certain countries.207
 
 196. Rothchild, supra note 78, at 1232. 
 
 197. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
 198. Id. at 216. 
 199.  In order to understand where Wiley fits within the body of relevant case law, this 
Note provides a summary of prior court holdings, including Wiley, in a table at the end of the 
Note. See Table I. 
 200. See id. at 212. 
 201. See id. at 212–13. 
 202. See id. at 213 n.6. 
 203. See id. at 213. 
 204. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. 08 Civ. 7834, 2009 WL 3364037, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009). 
 205. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 213. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id.  For example, one back cover read: 
  Authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East Only. 
  This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
only [and] may not be exported.  Exportation from or importation of this book to 
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The defendant, Supap Kirtsaeng, moved to the United States to study 
mathematics at Cornell University.208  In an effort to earn money to pay for 
his education, Kirtsaeng’s family and friends shipped him Wiley Asia 
textbooks to resell at a higher price in the United States.209
Wiley filed an action against Kirtsaeng, asserting, among other copyright 
violations, a claim of infringement under section 501 of the Copyright Act, 
alleging that Wiley’s exclusive importation rights under section 602(a) had 
been violated.
 
210  Kirtsaeng asserted that the first sale doctrine protected his 
actions.211  However, the district court rejected this argument.212  Judge 
Donald C. Pogue stated that “[t]here is no indication that the imported 
books at issue here were manufactured pursuant to the U.S. Copyright 
Act . . . [t]o the contrary, the textbooks introduced as evidence purport, on 
their face, to have been published outside of the United States.”213  Judge 
Pogue held that “lawfully made under this title” only applies to works 
manufactured in the United States.214  Thus, Kirtsaeng was found liable for 
willfully infringing eight of Wiley’s copyrighted books.215
B.  The Second Circuit’s Decision 
 
In a 2–1 decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding 
that Kirtsaeng could not use the first sale doctrine as a defense.216  The 
court identified the legal issue as whether the district court correctly 
interpreted the phrase “lawfully made under this title” to mean that section 
109(a) only applies to works made domestically.217  The Second Circuit 
concluded that the phrase “refers specifically and exclusively to copies that 
are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to 
foreign-manufactured works.”218
1.  Majority Opinion 
 
In deciding Wiley, the Second Circuit reviewed the plain language of 
section 109(a), and looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Quality King, 
which held that the first sale doctrine limits the scope of section 602(a).219
 
another region without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a violation of 
the Publisher’s rights.  The Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights.  
The Publisher may recover damages and costs, including but not limited to lost 
profits and attorney’s fees, in the event legal action is required. 
  
Id. (alteration in original). 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. at 213–14. 
 211. See id. at 214. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. 08 Civ. 7834, 2009 WL 
3364037, at *9). 
 214. See Wiley, 2009 WL 3364037, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009). 
 215. See Wiley, 654 F.3d at 215. 
 216. See id. at 224. 
 217. Id. at 216. 
 218. Id. at 222. 
 219. See id. at 217–18. 
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The Second Circuit initially stated that “[t]here is at least some tension” 
between the broad importation rights of section 602(a)(1) and the limitation 
to copyright holder’s distribution rights under section 109(a).220  The court 
noted that the Supreme Court had addressed the “interplay” between these 
provisions in Quality King.221  The Second Circuit found that because the 
goods at issue in Quality King had been produced domestically and were 
imported to the United States only after a “round trip,” the facts of the case 
were distinguishable from Wiley.222
Because Quality King did not involve goods that have been manufactured 
abroad, the Second Circuit used the case’s dicta as a “guide[]” to the issue 
at hand.
 
223  By relying on the Supreme Court’s explanation of how sections 
109(a) and 602(a) “retain significant independent meaning” and quoting the 
hypothetical, the majority asserted that this “suggests that copyrighted 
material manufactured abroad cannot be subject to the first sale doctrine 
contained in § 109(a).”224  The court also repeated the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning that “§ 602(a)(1) had a broader scope than § 109(a),” meaning 
that the importation ban was expansive enough to prohibit goods made 
abroad.225
The Second Circuit felt “comforted” that the holding in the instant case 
was what the “Justices appear[ed] to have had in mind when deciding 
Quality King.”
 
226  The court justified its conclusion by arguing that “[t]he 
Supreme Court [in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.] . . . seemed 
poised to transform this dicta into holding.”227  Omega, however, was 
decided by a split court, and affirmed without explanation.228  Because 
Costco was not binding precedent, the Second Circuit continued with a 
detailed analysis of the first sale doctrine.229
Guided by the maxims of statutory interpretation, the Second Circuit 
conceded that the language, “lawfully made under this title,” was “simply 
unclear.”
 
230  Based on the text alone, the court found that the phrase could 
have at least three possible interpretations:  “(1) ‘manufactured in the 
United States,’ (2) ‘any work made that is subject to protections under this 
title,’ or (3) ‘lawfully made under this title had this title been 
applicable.’”231
Although it ultimately concluded that the text was ambiguous, the circuit 
court discussed the first interpretation in depth.
 
232
 
 220. Id. at 217. 
  First, the court found 
 221. Id.; see supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text. 
 222. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 217.  The Second Circuit drew from Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence in Quality King. See id. 
 223. Id. at 218. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 221. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 218. 
 228. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 229. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 218. 
 230. Id. at 220. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 219–20. 
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that it was “consistent with the text of § 109(a)” and with the presumption 
of territoriality in statutory construction of copyright laws.233  The court, 
however, refuted the presumption against extraterritorial application by 
noting that other sections of the Copyright Act “explicitly take account of 
activity occurring abroad.”234  Furthermore, the court noted that the U.S. 
Copyright Office had indicated that other sections that use the phrase 
“lawfully made under this title” should not be limited to works created in 
the United States.235  Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded that if 
Congress had intended section 109(a) to only apply to works manufactured 
domestically, Congress would have clearly stated so.236
Although the court did not discuss the latter two interpretations in depth, 
it recognized in a footnote that these definitions would be in Kirtsaeng’s 
favor.
 
237  As with the first interpretation, both were in line with the text of 
the statute and both were used elsewhere in the Copyright Act.238  This 
again brought the court to conclude that Congress could have explicitly 
stated its intention.239  Because of these divergent analyses, the court found 
the text of the statute to be “utterly ambiguous”240
The Second Circuit determined that the importation ban was “obviously 
intended to allow copyright holders some flexibility to divide or treat 
differently the international and domestic markets for the particular 
copyrighted work.”
 and looked to the 
importation clause for further guidance. 
241  The court reasoned that if the first sale doctrine was 
meant to apply to goods manufactured abroad, then section 602(a)(1) 
“would have no force in the vast majority of cases” because copyright 
holders would not have control to distinguish foreign markets.242
 
 233. Id. at 219 (citing to precedent that defined “under” as “subject to” and “governed 
by”); id. at 219 n.31; see also supra notes 
  Although 
the court noted that it was a “close call,” it rejected the Ninth Circuit’s rule 
188–96 and accompanying text. 
 234. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 219.  Specifically, section 104(b)(2) states that “[t]he works 
specified by sections 102 and 103, when published, are subject to protection under this title 
if the work is first published in the United States or in a foreign nation that, on the date of 
the first publication, is a treaty party[.]” Id. (alterations in original).  The court explained that 
in this context, section 109(a) could apply to “any work that is subject to protection under 
this title,” because section 104(b)(2) provided that works may protected under copyright law 
even if they were not manufactured in the United States. Id. at 219–20. 
 235. Id. at 220 (discussing section 1006(a)(1), which provides for royalty payments to a 
copyright holder where the work is “lawfully made under this title”).  Although the court did 
not provide the relevant language they relied on from the U.S. Copyright Office, see id. at 
220 n.37, the relevant website states that “[u]nder the Act, manufacturers and importers of 
[the works] . . . who distribute the products in the United States” are subject to royalty 
payments, see Digital Audio Recording Technology (DART) Factsheet on Filing Claims for 
Royalty Distribution, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/carp/dartfact.html 
(emphasis added) (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 236. See Wiley, 654 F.3d at 220. 
 237. See id. at 220 n.38. 
 238. See id. at 220. 
 239. See id. at 220 n.38. 
 240. Id. at 220. 
 241. Id. at 221. 
 242. Id. 
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that section 109(a) could apply to goods made abroad where the copyright 
holder had given permission for a first sale in the United States.243
The Second Circuit declined to afford legal weight to the policy 
consequences of its holding, instead stating that such concerns were for 
Congress to address.
 
244  The majority did, however, address the policy 
issues in a footnote.245  The court acknowledged the risk of incentivizing 
copyright holders to manufacture their products abroad, which would 
“circumvent the availability of the first sale doctrine as a defense” and 
essentially create complete control for the copyright holder for all future 
sales.246  Nevertheless, the court asserted that “[i]f we have misunderstood 
Congressional purpose in enacting the first sale doctrine, or if our 
discussion leads to policy consequences that were not foreseen by Congress 
or which Congress now finds unpalatable, Congress is of course able to 
correct our judgment.”247
2.  Dissent 
 
Judge Garvan Murtha dissented, arguing that the first sale defense should 
be available for “a copy of a work that enjoys United States copyright 
protection wherever manufactured.”248  Judge Murtha first looked to the 
text of the statute.  As the majority recognized, he noted that section 109(a) 
does not indicate a location of manufacture, and that Congress has 
otherwise been explicit in the Copyright Act when it intended location to be 
dispositive.249  Counter to the majority’s holding, Judge Murtha reasoned 
that “under this title” refers to Title 17, the copyright law, and thus 
concluded that the phrase means “manufactured lawfully under title 17.”250  
Therefore, because a “copy authorized by the U.S. rightsholder is lawful 
under U.S. copyright law,” the place of manufacture should be irrelevant.251
Focusing on the evolution of the first sale doctrine, Judge Murtha 
explained that under the common law, the doctrine supported a policy 
against trade restraints.
 
252  He pointed to Quality King and argued that 
when Congress changed the wording of the statute from “lawfully 
obtained” to “lawfully made under this title,” it did not intend to narrow the 
doctrine’s applicability.253
 
 243. Id. 
 
 244. See id. at 222. 
 245. See id. at 222 n.44. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 222. 
 248. Id. at 225 (Murtha, J., dissenting). 
 249. See id. at 226.  Judge Murtha mentioned 17 U.S.C. § 601(a), the now-expired 
manufacturing requirement, that used both the language “under this title” and “manufactured 
in the United States or Canada.” Id.; see also supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.  
Judge Murtha also mentioned § 104(b)(2). See Wiley, 654 F.3d at 226. 
 250. Wiley, 654 F.3d at 226–27. 
 251. Id. at 226. 
 252. See id. at 227. 
 253. See id. (citing Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 U.S. 
135, 152 (1998)). 
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Judge Murtha then discussed the policy implications of the majority’s 
decision.  He posited that Congress did not have intend to incentivize 
copyright holders to produce their works abroad, where they would have 
more copyright protection, by essentially “[g]ranting [them] unlimited 
power to control all commercial activities . . . of [their] work.”254  Two 
consequences of this would be “high transaction costs” and “uncertainty in 
the secondary market.”255
Judge Murtha argued that the Ninth Circuit’s holdings were “in direct 
conflict” with the Supreme Court’s holding in Quality King, because in that 
case the Court stated that location of a sale was irrelevant to a first sale 
analysis.
 
256  He also rejected the notion that section 602(a) would be 
“meaningless” if the first sale doctrine was a defense for foreign-made 
goods.257 Judge Murtha asserted that section 602(a) would still bar the 
importation of pirated goods, works that have not been sold, or, as the 
Quality King court noted in dicta, goods lawfully made under some other 
law.258
III.  THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE LOCATION 
OF MANUFACTURE 
 
On April 16, 2012, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to 
review the Second Circuit’s decision in Wiley.259
Part III explains why the Second Circuit incorrectly interpreted the first 
sale doctrine.  By holding that section 109(a) cannot be a defense for goods 
manufactured abroad, courts are expanding copyright protection and 
creating rights for copyright holders that contradict the fundamental 
principles of copyright law.  The Second Circuit’s holding means that no 
copyrighted good purchased abroad can ever be sold without the copyright 
  The 4–4 split of the 
Justices in Omega not only failed to provide any binding precedent, but also 
demonstrates that multiple interpretations of section 109(a)’s applicability 
are plausible.  Indeed, the Supreme Court will give the circuit courts 
guidance on how sections 109(a) and 602(a) interact.  This Note argues that 
the Supreme Court should vacate and remand the Second Circuit’s holding.  
The Court should hold that the first sale doctrine should be interpreted as 
limiting the importation clause, regardless of the location of manufacture or 
the location of the first sale.  However, beyond the scope of this Note is the 
question if, on remand, Kirtsaeng should be liable under section 602(a) due 
to the potential contractual agreement in the textbooks limiting resale only 
within certain countries. 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id.  The court continued, “An owner first would have to determine the origin of the 
copy—either domestic or foreign—before she could sell it.  If it were foreign made and the 
first sale doctrine does not apply to such copies, she would need to receive permission from 
the copyright holder.” Id. 
 256. Id. at 228. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
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holder’s permission in the United States.  Further, allowing the first sale to 
be a defense in this context would not be an impermissible extraterritorial 
application. 
Part III.A applies the arguments from the case law, statutes, and 
legislative history to analyze the doctrine’s textual development and the 
phrase “lawfully made under this title.”  Revisiting the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Quality King, Part III.B explains how the Wiley court does not 
follow binding precedent, and instead incorrectly relies on dicta, leading to 
an erroneous reading of section 109(a).  Part III.C analyzes the underlying 
policy considerations of both copyright law generally and the first sale 
doctrine, and demonstrates that Congress intended for the first sale doctrine 
to apply to foreign-made works.  Finally, Part III.D rejects the argument 
that applying the first sale doctrine to foreign-made works would be an 
impermissible extraterritorial application of the statute. 
A.  Textual Analysis 
1.  The Confusion with Section 109(a) 
Because the phrase “lawfully made under this title” is not defined in the 
Copyright Act, there is confusion as to when the first sale doctrine may be 
asserted as a defense.260  For example, the Third Circuit defines the phrase 
as “lawfully made under Title 17,”261 while in the Ninth Circuit, the phrase 
means “lawfully manufactured on U.S. soil or if made abroad, having at 
least one authorized sale in the U.S.”262  More recently, the Second Circuit 
defined the phrase as “lawfully manufactured in the United States.”263
Under the normal rules of statutory construction, “lawfully made under 
Title 17” is the only possible interpretation.  Where a phrase is not 
explicitly defined, the Court will “normally construe it in accord with its 
ordinary or natural meaning.”
 
264  The common usage of the phrase means 
“made according to the Copyright Act.”265  The Supreme Court had not 
previously interpreted “under this title” to mean anything other than 
“according to the applicable title.”266
An ambiguous statutory provision may be interpreted in light of similar 
language in other parts of the code that “make[] its meaning clear, or 
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect 
  Thus, the first sale doctrine should 
apply to works made consistent with the terms of the Copyright Act. 
 
 260. See supra Part I.B. 
 261. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 166, 181 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra notes 217–18, 241–42 and accompanying text. 
 264. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). 
 265. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2487 (2002) (defining “under” as “in 
accordance with”). 
 266. See N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).  In that case, the claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) required a proceeding “under this title,” and the Court looked 
to Title 42 without any controversy. See id. at 60–61. 
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that is compatible with the rest of the law.”267  The phrase “lawfully made 
under this title” is notably used two other times in Title 17:  (1) section 
110268 excuses liability copies for educational use that are “lawfully made 
under this title”269 and (2) section 1006 of the Audio Home Recording 
Act270 (AHRA) provides for royalty payments for audio recordings 
“lawfully made under this title.”271
If the Wiley interpretation of “under this title”—“made in the United 
States”—were applied to the phrase, then section 110 would not protect 
teachers if they use legally made works from foreign countries.  Applying 
the same definition to the AHRA, copyright holders would not receive 
royalty payments for recordings that had been made abroad.  However, 
section 1004,
 
272 which was enacted at the same time as section 1006, 
explicitly provides for royalty payments for imported works.273
Where Congress intended location to be important, it explicitly wrote it 
into the statute.
  By 
comparison, the Sebastian definition is more logical, especially as it would 
apply to the AHRA.  The two sections would not directly conflict in 
meaning; rather, royalties would be given for imported goods as long as 
they were “lawfully made under Title 17.”  Therefore, only the natural 
meaning of the phrase would allow each provision to be read coherently. 
274  Under the rules of statutory construction, this omission 
is considered deliberate and “speaks volumes.”275  Specifically, when 
Congress enacted section 602(a), it began to phase out the manufacturing 
clause.276  In contrast to the Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 
109(a), the House Report specifically mentioned that the manufacturing 
clause “violates the basic principle that an author’s rights should not be 
dependent on the circumstances of manufacture”277
 
 267. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
371 (1988) (internal citation omitted). 
 and that the elimination 
of the clause would not intend to drive manufacturing abroad.  It would be 
illogical to conclude that Congress made these comments while also 
intending to drive manufacturing abroad.  Rather, if Congress had actually 
 268. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006). 
 269. Id. § 110 (1) 
 270. Id. §§ 1001–1007. 
 271. Id. § 1006(a)(1)(A). 
 272. Id. § 1004. 
 273. Id. § 1004(a)(1). 
 274. See supra note 234 (discussing section 104(b)(2)), note 249 (discussing section 
601(a)).  There are a number of statutes outside of the Copyright Act that use the phrase 
“manufactured in the United States.” E.g., 14 U.S.C. § 97(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he Coast Guard 
may not procure buoy chain—that is not manufactured in the United States.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1124 (2006) (prohibiting the importation of goods that “bear a name or mark calculated to 
induce the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States”); 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1673(C)(l)(2) (2006) (allowing penalties where a trading partner “no longer prevents the 
suppression or undercutting of domestic prices of merchandise manufactured in the United 
States”). 
 275. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 14 (1994). 
 276. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra note 45. 
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intended for the first sale doctrine to be a defense only for goods 
manufactured in the United States, it would have stated such an intent. 
Furthermore, despite its repeal, the manufacturing clause provides 
helpful guidance in understanding the statutory language.278  Under 
principles of statutory interpretation, statutes should be construed “to have 
used no superfluous words.”279
Instead, the legislative reports consistently state that the 1976 language 
was meant to “restate[] and confirm[] the principle” of the first sale doctrine 
that had “been established by the court decisions and section 27 of the 
[1909 Act].”
  Because section 601 used “under this title” 
and “manufactured in the United States” in the same sentence, Congress 
must have intended them to have separate meanings.  Therefore, “under this 
title” cannot mean “made in the United States.” 
280  Under the old law, Kirtsaeng would not be liable for 
infringement because the books were “lawfully obtained.”  In light of the 
congressional intent to keep the meaning of the language the same, his 
actions should not be considered infringement under the updated law.  Had 
Congress intended to limit the scope of the first sale doctrine to 
domestically manufactured copies, it would have not implicitly accepted the 
Bobbs-Merrill holding.281
2.  Section 602(a) 
 
The structure of section 602(a) should also be scrutinized.  The 
syllogistic analysis used in Sebastian is a thorough and convincing 
explanation of the language.282  Standing alone, section 602(a) could be 
interpreted as a bright-line rule disallowing any unauthorized 
importation.283  However, if Congress did not intend section 109(a) to limit 
section 602(a), then section 602(a) would not explicitly say that importation 
“without the authority of the owner” is an “infringement of the exclusive 
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106.”284  Under the 
express language of the statute, importation is an additional right under 
section 106 and is subject to the exceptions in sections 107 through 122.285
 
 278. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
  
Any other interpretation would mean that neither the first sale doctrine, nor 
any of the other exceptions in sections 107 through 122, limits the right of 
importation. 
 279. Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48 (1878); see Bailey v. United States, 516 
U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each 
term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”). 
 280. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 56–60, 69 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text; see also 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006). 
 284. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a). 
 285. See id. 
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Many courts have argued that section 602(a) would be rendered 
“virtually meaningless”286 or “have no force”287 if the first sale doctrine 
could be a defense for goods made abroad.  Not only did the Supreme Court 
directly address this issue and find it unpersuasive,288 the importation 
clause would still prohibit importation in a number of instances.289  Besides 
the undisputed prohibition of pirated goods, it would also disallow any 
importation where the importer is violating a contractual agreement.  For 
example, importation is prohibited where a person licensed to only 
manufacture and sell goods in a foreign market instead sells in the United 
States.  The licensee could not use the first sale doctrine as a defense to 
copyright infringement because there has not been any first sale, but only an 
infringing importation that violated a contract.290
Similarly, because the first sale doctrine is only a defense where the title 
of the good itself has been transferred, a lessee or bailee could not import 
the good without authorization.
 
291  For example, section 602(a) would 
provide a remedy against an importer who is meant to bring goods (that 
have not yet had a first sale) to a foreign country but instead brings the 
goods to the United States.  Thus, there are a number of situations in which 
there has been no authorized first sale, and section 602(a) would prohibit 
importation of the good. 
B.  Conflicting with Precedent 
Although the Second Circuit may look to other courts for guidance, the 
only binding precedent on this issue is from Quality King, where the good 
was produced domestically.292  Although the Second293 and Ninth294 
Circuits have distinguished later cases from Quality King, the Supreme 
Court did not intend to limit its holding to the particular facts of Quality 
King.295  Instead, the Court decided that the importation clause was subject 
to the first sale doctrine.296   
The circuit courts did not believe that they would be bound by that 
holding due to the confusing hypothetical and Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence.297
 
 286. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc. 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); supra notes 
  However, Justice Ginsburg was the only Justice who did 
108, 132 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
 288. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 258 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra  notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing that in Quality King, the 
goods were produced in the United States); supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text 
(stating that in Wiley, the goods were produced abroad). 
 293. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 143–55 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 151–55 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 174–79, 219–29 and accompanying text. 
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not think that the decision would resolve the concern regarding foreign-
made goods.298  If the eight other Justices agreed with her concurrence, 
they would have expressly included her opinion in the majority holding or 
opted to concur as well.  It is therefore a stretch for courts to use Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence to invalidate the scope of the Supreme Court’s 
majority holding. 
Moreover, both the Second and Ninth Circuits severely misconstrue the 
British publisher hypothetical, which the Supreme Court provided as 
dicta.299  The circuit courts understood the example to mean that a good 
could only be “lawfully made under this title” if it was made 
domestically.300  The hypothetical, however, does not refer to place of 
manufacture, but instead refers to the rights given to each publisher.301 
In the example, the copyright holder transferred her U.S. distribution 
rights to the U.S. publisher and her British distribution rights to the British 
publisher.302  The British publisher would not sell its books in the United 
States, whether the books were printed in the United Kingdom or in the 
United States, because the British publisher only had the exclusive right to 
reproduce and distribute the books in the United Kingdom.  That this 
illustration was also discussed in the oral argument reveals that the example 
is merely a tool to show how authors can allocate rights between 
markets.303 
Instead of the emphasis on location of manufacture that lower courts 
have since constructed, the main takeaway should be that the lack of a first 
sale by the British publisher means that section 109(a) cannot be a 
defense.304  This understanding conforms to the interpretation of “lawfully 
made under Title 17” because it looks at the rights granted in accordance 
with the Copyright Act. 
C.  Policy Concerns 
The following policy issues demonstrate that Congress could not have 
intended the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the first sale doctrine.  These 
concerns are particularly relevant because they speak to the legislative 
intent behind the language of the first sale doctrine.305  In other words, the 
effects of the interpretation of “lawfully made under this title” are important 
not only because of their policy implications, but also because of what they 
reveal about Congress’s intent at the time of enactment. 
 
 298. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
The main purpose of copyright law and the first sale doctrine is to 
provide a benefit to the public while balancing creators’ rights with the 
 299. See supra notes 179, 222–25 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 179, 222–25 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 305. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timber of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 
U.S. 365, 171 (1988) (stating that statutory construction “is a holistic endeavor”). 
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ultimate goal of promoting creativity.306  In disallowing a first sale defense, 
courts are hurting the public by shifting the balance away from “advancing 
welfare”—the underlying purpose of copyright—to expanding authors’ 
rights. 
Instead of using the underlying principle of the first sale doctrine—to 
further the free alienation of property307—the Wiley decision puts restraints 
on property.  As seen in a number of cases, companies that sell goods that 
are not generally entitled to copyright protection sometimes use a 
copyrighted item to gain control over the product.308  For example, by 
placing a copyrighted label on a box or engraving a copyrighted design into 
a good, a copyright owner will have complete control over pricing and 
distribution.  Under Wiley, this control will exist regardless of how many 
sales of a good are made,309 so long as the item is manufactured in a foreign 
country, any subsequent purchaser of the product will need to get the 
copyright owner’s authorization.310 
This interpretation shifts the balance of control toward authors by 
creating a nearly unlimited distribution right for goods that are 
manufactured abroad.  Further, it creates an incentive for U.S. companies to 
manufacture abroad, which also hurts public welfare by taking away U.S. 
jobs.311  Moreover, copyright holders will now be able to get an unlimited 
amount of rewards, whenever the good is manufactured in another country.  
Thus, the only beneficiaries of this result are publishers and copyright 
holders. 
This interpretation will also have negative effects on U.S. consumers and 
citizens by reducing the secondary market.  Although there are justified 
arguments against the gray market,312 section 602(a) would likely become a 
major tool in the battle against the gray market, and decrease or even 
extinguish parallel importation.313  In the absence of the gray market, 
companies can price discriminate in foreign markets without limitation.314
 
 306. See supra notes 
  
They could therefore set a price for a book in India at a nominal rate, and 
price it for the domestic market however they please.  U.S. consumers may 
not buy the product at all if they are required to pay the high price.  In such 
10–14 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 62. 
 308. See supra notes 112, 134, 146, 167 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 311. See generally supra note 246 and accompanying text.  Economists have argued that 
despite the negative effect on the U.S. job market, there is a positive effect for U.S. firms, 
leading to a potentially neutral or positive new effect. See, e.g., Subhayu Bandyopadhyay et 
al., An Evaluation of the Employment Effects of Barriers to Outsourcing 2 (Inst. for the 
Study of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 5426, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1741614.  This Note does not contemplate the overall economic effects of overseas 
manufacturing, but instead argues that taking away jobs from U.S. manufacturers would 
harm the economy. 
 312. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
3090 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
an instance, the public is no longer benefitting from creative works, which 
is the main purpose of copyright law.315 
Sometimes, however, consumers cannot simply to choose not to buy an 
item, such as when a textbook is required for a class.316  Thus, students are 
faced with a dilemma:  purchase the book at an increased price or lose an 
educational opportunity.  As Wiley demonstrated,317 textbook importation is 
a common problem for manufacturers.318  And yet, selling foreign-made 
textbooks at a lower price provides students greater access to these works.  
It would be illogical to assume that Congress would have eliminated the 
gray market, while at the same time creating laws that further its 
expansion.319 
Moreover, the Wiley holding has the potential to create uncertainty for 
purchasers of works because many do not know where goods were 
manufactured.320  Libraries could be hurt because they may be unable to 
lend books without risking lawsuits from the copyright holders.321  The 
Wiley holding also threatens many other areas of commerce, such as 
internet retailers to second-hand shops.322  Because ignorance is not a 
defense to copyright infringement,323 sellers and buyers would have to 
spend more time determining the status of a purchased item.  This is 
detrimental to the public welfare because it limits the public’s access to 
works, and causes economic waste by creating an excessive amount of 
surplus for copyright holders, through search costs and the inability to 
resell. 
D.  Extraterritorial Application 
Allowing the first sale doctrine as a defense would not lead to 
extraterritorial application.  Extraterritorial application exists when a law 
regulates conduct occurring outside of the United States.324
CONCLUSION 
  Here, the 
conduct being regulated—how a U.S. court should decide cases where the 
good is sold in the United States—is within the United States.  The 
plaintiffs in these cases do not argue that the manufacture abroad was 
impermissible.  Instead, the conduct at issue is purely domestic in that it 
would alter importation into this country. 
The Supreme Court should hold that the first sale doctrine provides a 
defense for all goods that have had a first sale.  The scope of protection 
 
 315. See supra notes 10–14, 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra notes 90, 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra note 89. 
 320. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 183. 
 322. See supra note 182. 
 323. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 188–96 and accompanying text. 
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should not depend on the location of the first sale or the location of 
manufacture.  Rejecting the first sale defense on these criteria goes against 
the underlying principles of copyright law, and distorts the natural language 
of the Copyright Act.  Given the number of inconsistencies in the case law, 
the Supreme Court should simply hold that once a first sale occurs, the 
copyright holder’s distribution right is exhausted. 
  

